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NOTE REGARDING STUDIES OF NEAR MIDAIR COLLISIONS
In response to requests from the FAA and various other organizations in the aviation com-
munity, the ASRS staff has conducted several studies of reports of near midair collisions. Similar
studies have been under way within the FAA. It has been intended to include analytical reports of
the results of the ASPS studies in this quarterly report; however, in order to permit detailed review
and comparison of the finding of all the studies, it is necessary to delay publication of the ASRS
results. They will appear in the ASRS Tenth Quarterly Report, which will be largely devoted to
studies of human and system factors associated with potential conflicts and near midair collisions.
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NASA AVIATION SAFETY REPORTING SYSTEM:
NINTIt QUARTERLY REPORT
Ames Research Center
and
Aviation Safety Reporting System Office*
SUMMARY
This ninth quarterly progress report of ASRS operations contains two analytic studies and a
section illustrating the alert bulletin process.
The first study, Distraction -- A Human Factor in Air Carrier Hazard Events, looks at one of
the human factors frequently mentioned in ASPS reports as a cause of or contributor to hazardous
events. The report describes a study of distractions, an element in the series of investigations of air
carrier human factors being conducted by the ASRS research group.
The second study, A Summary of the Characteristics of the ASPS Database, discusses the
attributes of the safety reports that have been analyzed, processed, and entered into the ASRS
database since the program's inception.
A sampling of alert bulletins and responses to them is also presented.
INTRODUCTION
This is the ninth in a series of reports describing operations of the NASA Aviation Safety
Reporting System (ASRS) (refs. 1--8) under a Memorandum of Agreement signed on August 15,
1975 by the National Aeronautics and Space Adminis:tration and the Federal Aviation
Administration.
This report contains two studies based on information '_ontalned in the ASRS database. The.
fast is an analytic study of reports dealing with distractions !_ the air carrier operational environ-
ment. The second is a statistical summary of the ASPS database itself. A third section presents a
sampling of alert bulletins disseminated by ASPS and of the re'sponses to them.
*Battelle's Columbus Division, Mountain View, California 94043.
DISTRACTION- A HUMAN FACTOR IN AIR CARRIER HAZARD EVENTS
Capt. William P. Monan*
It has long been recognized by aviation safety workers that the attribution of an accident or incident to
"pilot error" leaves unanswered the question of why the error was committed.
Working paper on Human Factors in Aircraft Operations
Ames Research Center, NASA
INTRODUCTION
To date, approximately 2500 voluntary reports involving air carrier scheduled operations have
been submitted to the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASP, S). Since most reports to the ASILS
narrate self-admitted errors, it is not surprising that the majority of airman iricidents are classified
by ASPS researchers as associated with one form or another of "pilot error.'"
In past years, when aviation specialists and the public believed in the myth of the pilot-hero, a
semi-godlike figurewith white scarf, and Ray-Ban sunglasses that the aviation community itself
created, classification of an event as pilot error would have been adequate explanation of probable
cause. Our hero had failed, he was not expected to fail, he must not, will not fail again. That was
usually the end of investigation.
The myth of the pilot-hero emerged from our own fears, our seat-in-the-cabin helplessness, and
self-knowledge of our own human weaknesses. Became we trusted him with our lives in a dangerous
environment, it was a natural step to build his image into a father-hero symbol endowed with
superhuman qualifies. Believing in such an image, how could we gracefully and publicly interrogate
him about human limitations whenever he temporarily failed to perform infallibly?The failur_ :of
the image was cause enough to explain the accident.
This belief in a myth, the airman-hero, was probably a base for the psychological block that
permitted acceptance of "pilot error" as the final analysis of an accident. Further, the hero myth
has unduly delayed human factor research into unsafe or hazardous aviation oocurrences.
The ASRS - which offers a unique opportunity to explore the "why" of a pilot error by
supporting research into the identification and interrelationships of the coincidences comprising the
well known "chain of eventLs'"always manifested in an unsafe aviation occurrence - has been used
in studying several aspects of air carrier fright-crew performance. The basic integrity of the individ-
ual pilot, perhaps the most fundamental and important human factor element, is strongly evidenced
in the tone and attitude of "the written narratives in the reports. Admissions of error axe offered
without alibi or excuse. Often included is a searching, personal self-scrutiny for the real cause of the
event. This search for truth, conducted without false pride or vanity, is and always has been the
hallmark of the working professional airman.
*Principal research scientist, on the staff of BatteUe's Columbus Laboratories (BCL), assigned to BCL's ASPS
project. He was formerly with an international air cartier, retired in April 1978 as regional director of flight
operations.
Becauseall reports are unverified narratives of only "'one side of the story," no attempt to
place blame or criticism has been made by ASRS researchers. Reporter input and research output
are learning experiences into the "why" and not the "'who" in unsafe aviation occurrences.
One of the frequently occurring causes of hazardous events in air carrier operations is the
human susceptibility to distractions. This report describes the study of this tofaic, carded out as one
element in the series of air carder human-factors investigations being conducted by the ASRS
research group.
COCKPIT DISTRACTION: CAUSES AND TYPES
Distraction: that which draws the sight, mind or attention to a different object, or, confusingly attracts
in different directions at once.
Webster's Third International Dictionary
.- 1963-Edition
Confirmation of the frequency with which distractions occur in the cockpit is obtained by
noting that distraction appeared more frequently than any other human factor in the ASRS data-
base. A total of 169 distraction events were identified in the voluntary reports submitted by air
carrier pilots.
The enabling or associated causes for those 169 occurrences fell into two distinct categories:
1. Nonflight operations activities consisting of company-required tasks, such as public address
announcements, on/off blocks messages, logbook paperwork, and flight-service/passenger problems.
Untimely cockpit conversations that interfered with airman duties were also classified in this
category.
We were climbing out of XYZ airport. The first officer was flying. I acknowledged a
7,000 ft restriction, then went back to my paperwork. I didn't see the F.O. set
17,000 in the altitude select window. As we passed 12,000, Center called, wanted to
know where we were going ....
2. Flight operations taslc_, internal to crew functioning, with the came of distraction often
noted in ASPS reports as "workload" or "excessive workload." These workloads consisted entirely
of routine duties normal to every flight: running checklists, looking for traffic, communicating with
ATe, handling minor malfunctions, avoiding buildups, and monitoring radar. An overlap of any
combination of these tasks in a short time frequently triggered a distraction event, t
tAir-carrier airmen, especially senior captains, may have some difficulty in accepting "distraction" as a cause
of any pilot's failure to aecompli_ simultanenm routine flight tasks. One supervisory airman stated: "Doing two
things at once is what we're paid for. If a _e .vtqtancan't do it then he's a no-good pilot. He just can't do the job." A
valid point, but the outline of the traditional pilot-hero myth shows through his words. To accept a'summary
judgment of competent/incompetent, good/no good for a single mistake due to workload would put us back into the
same attribution of accident/inddent due to "pilot error" without need for further investigation as to why the
failure occurred.
Wewereclearedto descend to 5,000. I was doing the approach checklist. Suddenly l
saw the altimeter going through 4,200. Before I could do anything, a light airplane
came over the top of us. We missed him by maybe 200 ft.
Both categories of distractions compromised safe flight operations in two separate ways:
1. An essential task was not accomplished. For example, failure to watch for traffic resulted in
several near-miss incidents.
2. Crew coordination or crew management was seriously interrupted or eliminated. This loss
of organized teamwork frequently led to crew inattention to flying the airplane with resultant
deviation from a desired flightpath.
Thoughtful analysis of the causes of distraction resulted in recognition that cockpit priorities
for routine task accomplishment followed consistent patterns. During "'excess!re workload" peaks,
the checklists were always accomplished, radar monitoring continued, and mirror malfunctions were
handled. However, routine traffic watch and ATC communications (especially at tower hand-off)
were apparently lower priority items and occasionally, were not accomplished in time to avoid an
unsafe occurrence.
In contrast, when a radar point-out of specific o'clock traffic, was made, then highest
priority was apparently given to finding the other aircraft. The priority was often so overriding that
crew management lapsed and cockpit coordination failed.
It was noted that most reported distraction events had def'mite interrelationships with the ATC
system. It appears that operational distractions that do not affect ATC regulations either do not
occur as frequently or are not as often reported to the ASPS system.
EFFECT OF. DISTRACTION
If airliners were flown by only one pilot, a any airman distraction could easily result in another
entry into the NTSB accident file. However, airline cockpits are manned by multiple-member crews
that operate as a team under crew-concept and human-redundancy principles. Thus, any air carrier
distraction report relating an unsafe occurrence leads the ASRS researcher toward consideration of
cockpit coordination and crew management practices.
From the viewpoint of distraction events, analysis of the reports volunteered by the airmen
indicate that crew management could be simplified into the accomplishment of two goals:
1. Timely and correct completion of a task or duty.
2. Adequate monitoring.of or action to ensure aircraft maintenance of a desired flightpath.
a,,During absence of the F/O from the flight deck, an airline captain misread his charts and deviated from
route. He summarized the event: "Single pilot operation has no normal safeguard with no second or third crew-
member on the flight deck." ""
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To achieve these goals, human engineering concepts have been applied to cockpit activities so
that air carder crews are trained not only to "'fail safe'" but to "'fail operational." In the identical
manner by which dual Category II autopilots monitor each other's electronic performance during an
autoland maneuver, crew members, guided by crew-concept policies, monitor each other's perfor-
mance, ready to restore normal operfition if and when an error or out-of-limits excursion should
occur.
If, due to distraction, one airman is removed from the operational loop, then a vital t:ross-
checking function is eliminated. The operation becomes vulnerable to any error committed during
"the one-man show." This mistake is more than a link in a chain of events; became it remains
unchallenged, it becomes a moving hook probing forward in time, ready to combine with other
pertinent coincidences.
If both pilots (or all three airmen) are distracted from monitoring or flying the aircraft, the
airplane is in jeopardy. If the distraction is protracted, then the flight is in utmost peril.
During the descent to our assigned altitude (7,000 ft) door warning light illumi-
nated. Pilot and copilo.t attention wa. diverted to depressurizing the aircraft. My
next instrument scan showed approximately 2,000 FPM descent passing through
6,000 ft. I immediately added full power and pitched up 25 ° and climbed at
4,000 FPM back up to' 7,000 ft. As we climbed, another aircraft called and asked
Center for our altitude. In writing this report I am not minimizing the error in crew
coordination: I personally will review my cockpit procedures ....
Table 1 shows the subdivision as to type of the 169 air carrier distraction reports comprising
the data base for this study.
TABLE 1.-TYPES OF REPORTED DISTRACTIONS
Nonoperational activities
Paperwork
PA system
Conversation
Flight attendant
Company radio
Operational - flight workload tasks
Number.
7
12
9
11
16
Checklist
Malfunciions
Traffic watch
ATC communications
Radar monitoring
Studying approach chart
Looking for airport
New tint officer
Fatigue
Miscellaneous
22
19
16
6
12
14
3
10
10
2
169
NONOPERATIONAL TYPES OF DISTRACTION
In addition to flying safely from "'A" to "B," airline cockpit crews are expected to assume
certain nonoperational responsibilities for the general well-being of their passengers. Crews also
must do some "'bookkeeping" for their employers: crew logs, engine logs, block/air times, and
similar computer-form entries. Many of these minor tasks trigger company communication messages
to the departure or arrival station.
Such company work tasks have long been recognized by airline management as potential
distractions from more essenti_ crew duties. Published policies attempt to eliminate such interrup-
tions as the stewardess entering the cockpit to order a wheelchair just as the aircraft overheads the
outer marker, or the chime of the interphone at top of descent: "'What time are we arriving at so
and so... ?"
A total of 55 ASRS reports dealt with cockpit distraction caused by dist-uptive activities not
related directly to the operation of the .aircraft.
"'Paperwork" Task Distractions
Nonessential paperwork should be delayed until the cruise segraent Of flight.
Paperwork done on the flight deck during climb and descent should be limited to that which is
ec_ntial ....
Air Carn'er Flight Operations Policy
In all "paperwork" di_tractions, the captain was the individual distracted from monitoring.
flightpath as flown by the first officer. All incidents resulted in altitude deviations from clearances,
':" all intercepted by ATe radar challenges, l:rfllhag "out logbooks; engine readings, on/off times,-and
perusing a sigmet chart were identified as the administrative tasks that caused significant
distractions.
All incidents occurred either in climb or descent. It would appear that adherence to a rule of
"no paperwork in climb or descent" would have prevented all of these distraction incidents.
From two reports: "I was digging in my briefcase for charts or copy of the filed clearance
messages." In the first, the flying pilot climbed 1,000 ft above ATC assigned altitude. In the second,
he started descent without ATC clearance with traffic below.
A typical airman report on "'paperwork" distraction:
We were cleared to 11,000 ft by departure control. Once the workload diminished I
started to complete the logbook and time sheets, etc. The F/O was flying and the
aircraft leveled off and picked up speed. As I finished the paperwork, Center called
and asked our altitude. I then noticed it was 10,000 ft.
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PublicAddressSystemDistractions
To mininfizeinterference_dthcockpitdutiesin terminal areas avoid using the PA system below
10,000 ft.
Air Carrier Flight Operations Policy
The usual effect of public address (PA) system distractions was removal of the captain from
the ATC communication loop. A misunderstood or misstated clearance altitude assignment by the
first officer then continued unchallenged into an "altitude bust," usually interrogated through ATC
radar monitoring. In some cases intraeockpit miscommunications were made by the nonflying pilot
setting the wrong altitude into the altitude select window.
In the instances of misinterpreted altitude clearance messages, there is rare mention of any
clearance readback confirming the altitude change with ATC. Several reports detailed prolonged
cockpit discussion as to the correctness of the clearance. Usually, an assumption was accepted that
the questioner "must have missed" a transmission while using the PA system.
One PA event probably considerably aged an anxious ARTS III radar controller when an air
carrier overshot his assigned flight level, FL280, by 700 ft while head-on traffic converged at
FL 290:
The copilot was on the public address telling the passengers about our thunderstorm
deviation. While climbing through FL 270, the no. 4 generator tripped off the line. I
asked the F/E to monitor the fault panel: the problem turned out to be a GCU
(Generator Control Llni0 and a decision was made to operate the generator isolated.
When I looked back at the instrument panel our altitude was 28,000. The autopilot
was disconnected and a normal smooth level-off accomplished. The total excursion
was approximately 700 ft.
There is a great deal to be learned from this incident. The public address system is a
great public relations tool but should riever be used in climb or descent.
ConversationDistractions
Irrelevant oonversation.., diverts attention from essential duties. It has caused accidents. It must not be
tolerated.
Air Carrier Flight Operations Policy
All cockpit conversations noted by the airmen were relevant, that. is, they dealt with opera-
tional matters: fuel load, time to descents, engine malfunctions, etc. Weather was never noted as a
factor. There were indications in several narratives that line-type instruction was being offered by
the captain. Two incidents centered on distraction due to cheek-airmen discussions. It is interesting
to note that when talking to each other, neither pilot was monitoring the aircraft path.
I feel this happened because for 30 or 40 sec we basically were not flying th_
airplane. The copilot was listening to me and I was talking so we goofed. It was sure
a reminder of how easy it is to be distracted ....
7
Sevenof the nine conversation-distractions resulted in "altitude busts"
assigned altitude or failing to level off after climb out.
- descending through
Flight Attendant Distractions
Most of the flight service distractions came in the descent phase and involved flight attendant
discussions with the captain about travel connections, cabin situations, and general passenger prob-
lems. Various errors resulted from this withdrawal of attention: misreading an altimeter by
I0,000 It, late descent, overshooting and undershooting altitude crossing restrictions, etc. Many of
these procedural mistakes, however, seerr_d to involve intracrew communication failures. An
amended clearance or new altitude assignment was "'ro_ered'" to ATC by one pilot but the informa-
tion was not passed on nor understanding confirmed by the other pilot.
Flight attendant discussing a cabin situation with captain. Clearance was received by
first officer for flight to cross 15 DME at or below FL 230. Captain crossed 15 DME
at 240. Previous cockpit coordination had been good. For some unknown reason
F/O failed to mention correct altitude required ....
The climb checklist was being accomplished and a flight attendant entered the
cockpit for the captain's signature. Shortly thereafter, departure requested verifica-
tions of our altitude which was reported as 7,800 for 8,000. We were then advised
that we were only cleared to 6,000 ....
We were at FL'230 and told to descend as to cross ABC at 18,000. I hurried to f'dl
out the engine readings. Just then a flight attendant came up front with a request for
a wheelchair. Center asked us for our altitude. We were just west of ABC and still at
FL 230. We had forgotten to descend ....
Company Radio Communication Distractions
Analysis of the 16 cockpit distractions caused by company communication tasks show that all
except one (no landing clearance) resulted in altitude deviations from ATC assignments. However,
only five of these were due to misunderstood ATC communications; nine were caused by flight
errors in which the flying pilot (FP) "inadvertently" departed his altitude without being intercepted
by the nonflying pilot (NFP) momentarily engaged in company transmissions. It is noteworthy that
in six of the nine events, the NFP belatedly recognized the altitude deviation prior to ATC radar
intervention. In five of these, the F[O was flying the plane (in the sixth incident the FP could not
be identified). In two of these cases the error was rectified by crew request for altitude confirma-
tion from ATC. In the four incidents of flight error in which the captain could be identified as the
flying pilot, there were no challenges by the F/O. In one narrative the flight engineer was communi-
cating with the company, the captain was busy on the PA system, and the F/O misunderstood an
ATC assigned altitude while descending the aircraft. Four of. the eight distractions occurred above
10,000 ft, outside terminal areas.
Wewerecominginto XYZ. Wecheckedin with approach, told to expect ILS. While
F/O was calling in range to the company I thought I understood Center to clear us
down to 4,000, so I started down ....
Perhaps the most typical event caused by a combination of distractions is a captain's self-
described "'parabolic capture" of an assigned 10,000-ft altitude:
We had a jump seat rider, the F/O was on the PA making the seat-belt announce-
ment and one air conditioner pack had overtemped and I was manually adjusting
same ....
He recommended the "'removal of all second officer duties from two-man aircraft, that is, PA
announcements, ATIS, paperwork, company radio calls, etc., etc., etc."
OPERATIONAL-TYPE DISTRACTIONS
Distractions that were internal to the crew were subtle and less readily identifiable than
obvious external interr_:ptions. These distractions Were the outcomes of routine cockpit tasks or
duties, which, when overlapped in a short time.,resulted in the often used phrase: "'excessive
workload."
The tasks were routine but esse.ntial. Typical Combinations narrated in the ASPS reports were:
running a checklist while taxiing, during climb, or during approach; radar monitoring while changing
altitudes; traffic watch at level-off; and ATC communications with weather avoidance. All are usual
flight-crew functions on every flight. When accomplishment of several such duties merged into
simultaneous activity through 4:oinddenee, poor planning, or urgencY, then a "distraction-due-to-
workload" event sbmetimes ocamed. This dis_ction almost always ended in failure to monitor or
to ensure the desired fiightpath of the aircraft.
We were cleared to descend to 5,000. I was doing the approach checklist. Suddenly I
saw altimeter going through 4,200. Before I could do anything a light airplane came
over the top of us, we missed him by 200 ft... ,3
Distraction, through a routine task, eliminated the vital cross-check function of monitoring
another crewman's error. The preoccupation of one pilot resulted in the classic "'one-man show.'" As
in most such events, the most insidious result of distraction is its effect on "crew management."
It is significant that only a few ASRS reports indicated that IFR conditions were pertinent
factors in any distraction event. The typical airline simulator training envelope of solid IFR from
lift-off to break-out was not duplicated in the "'real world" of on-line distraction events. Only those
reports that related avoidance of thunderheads, towering cumulus, or strong radar echoes had any
reference to outside environment as distraction factors.
3ASRS reports indicate that the plus-500-ft altitudes are critical traffic areas in avoiding "unknown VFR
traffic" near terminal areas.
9
In the great majority of incidents, distraction was associated with a good-weather CAVU°
situation. It would appear that routine workloads were not only greater in a see-and-avoid, blue-sky
world but far more dangerous due to the human factors limitations of flight crew members. As one
controller stated: "You never see an altitude bust in bad weather.'" And a pilot reported: "'Crews
should be more attentive to detail, especially when the weather is good."
Checklist Distractions
Typical air carrier flight policies indicate that the timing of completing the checklist is critical
in avoiding workload distractions.
Taxiing the aircraft demands constant attention.., delay reading the checklist until clear of congested
a teas.
Complete the takeoff checklist when local area navigation and ATC requkements haveJ_een met.
The approach checklist should be initiated ... before terminal area factors compromise the use of the
checklist.
Air Carrier Flight Operations Policies
Twenty-two reports of distraction incidents associated with reading checklists have been submitted
and are listed in table 2.
We were cleared for an ILS approach and advised to contact the tower at the outer
marker. At this time the crew became involved with checklists and inadvertently
forgot to Contact the tower prior to our landing.
TABLE 2.-CHECKLIST DISTRACTIONS .
Phase of flight Results
Climb checklist 7
Descent checklist 6
Landing checldist 6
Taxi checklist " 3
Total 22
Altitude deviations 9
No ian_ing dearance 6
Took another aircraft's
dearanc¢ by mistake 2
Unauthorized entry into
active runway 3
Failure in see-and-avoid
concept 2
Total 22
An analysis of those 22 reports
..... - .... revealed two characteristics that were com-
mon to all the reports.
1. Every rep_" indicated that check-
list accomplishment received cockpit prior-
ity over ATC requirements. Every incident
ended in a potential or actual violation of
ATC rules or regulations.
2. The checklist activity was almost
always going on at the same time other
cockpit tasks were being performed: radar
monitoring, minor malfunctions, systems
operation, traffic watch, etc. Checklist
accomplishment became a cause for distraction not by itself but as part of cockpit workload. In the
incidents reported, the workload became "excessive" and "'time ran out" before all tasks could be
completed.
I0
That airmen at least partly recognized the building workload is revealed in many narratives:
We were somewhat busy running the checklist, monitoring the radar, etc ....
• A near miss on approach at 2,500 ft was reported:
The simplistic answer to this is "'failed to see and avoid each other." A more realistic
observation is that the crew was very busy with landing checklist, studying the
approach and monitoring airspeed.
An altitude bust at 6,000 ft in climb-out:
We had a fight airplane and obtained a high rate of climb. Due to other distractions,
that is, rechecking SID, looking outside for traffic, resetting climb power, complet-
ing after takeoff checklist, changing frequencies, and selecting radials, we inadver-
tently passed through our assigned altitude. / -
There is a sense of haste or rushing threaded through several of the checklist/workload distractions.
An uncoordinated entry into the active runway caused a go-around and these words:
We were extremely busy from start of taxi to the runway. Three frequencies, a
checklist, physical movement of the aircraft. However, after the fact I realized we
were rushing too much.
Table 3 shows the distribution of factors that were instrumental in ending the distractions caused
by checklist procedures.
TABLE 3.-CHECKLIST DISTRACTION-
EVENT CHAIN BREAKERS
(]min broken by Number of reports
ATC/radar intervention
Flight crew recognition
Flight crew evasive action
None
Total
9
2
2
9
22
It appears clear from the ASRS reports that checklist accomplishment, when combined with
other flight crew tasks, becomes a specific factor in creating the well-known "excessive cockpit
workload.'"
During climbout from XYZ we were assigned 6,000 ft. At 5,000 the bell and light
altitude reminder worked as planned. The 1,000-to-level call was made. Climb che.ck-
lists were being completed, navaids tuned and identified, Center being reported _o,
and radar continuously monitored for isolated calls.
The 6,000-ft altitude was missed ....
11
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Malfunction Distractions
It is doubtful that a catastrophic engine failure at rotation is readily identified as a "distrac-
tion" by an air carrier pilot. Yet, by virtue of its power to divert a crew's attention from flying the
airplane -- keeping the aircraft precisely on a desired flightpath - any significant failure or malfunc-
tion qualities enlphatically as a flight crew distraction.
The intensive and recurrent drilling on simulator maneuvers, such as the lost engine after Vt or
engine fire bell on takeoff, tends to emphasize procedural correctness while blurring the equally
important management task of maintaining tile aircraft on a proper trajectory. The airman who
carries out the emergency procedures rapidly and exactly while the stall stick shaker is sounding will
not only obtain a "'IY" grade but hasdemonstrated distraction from proper and adequate attentive-
ness to flying the airplane.
The disciplined response in avoiding overconcentration upon an emergency or a serious near-
the-ground malfunction is apparently less emphasized in the handling of minor abnormalities at
higher altitudes. Table 4 lists the 19 malfunction-distradtion reports that were submitted to the
ASRS system; none were emergencies, all were relatively minor in seriousness.
TABLE 4.-MALFUNCTION DISTRACTIONS
Type of malfunction
Engine generator
Door warning
Pressurization
Duct overheat
Engine vibration
"Mechamcal problem:"
Autol_ot malfunction
Smoke in cockpit
Compass malfunction
Anti4ee light malfunction
Number of
reports
4
3
2
2
1
1
1
1
I
1
2
19
Results of distraction
Altitude deviation
from clearance
Deviation from route
No landing clearance
Penetrated restricted
airspace "
No deviations
Number of
reports
12
3
2
1
I
19
Eighteen of the 19 distractions resulted in inadequate monitoring or control of the desired
tlightpath. "'Cockpit management" and "'crew coordination" were the descriptive terms applied by
the diagnostic researc/_¢rs to these reports.
The reason why one malfunction distraction (battery smoke) did not result in a cockpit
management failure is evidenced by the reporter's recognition of the situation:
The pilot flying is responsible for calling out the memory items. This is distracting
and takes away from his primary job of flying the aircraft.
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It seems to me that it would be much better for one pilot to fly the aircraft and
communicate to ATC while the other pilot and the F/E handle the emergency.
In five reports of altitude deviations it was mentioned that the autopilot was on. This sug-
gested that crew awareness of instruments may be diminished when the autopilot is engaged, and
that they feel free to engage in protracted troubleshooting of the systems problem.
One report summarized:
Flight crews should be more aware (that) mechanical problems should not be
allowed to divert attention from the primary task of flying the airplane, even though
on autopilot at relatively high altitudes.
Malfunction distractions affected flight operations in two ways:
1. By distracting both (or all three) airmen, flightpath of the aircraft was ur/monitored.
While climbing we inadvertently exceeded the 6,000 crossing restriction at the VOR.
The cause of this incident was crew attention diverted by an engine vibration prob-
lem. The first officer, who was flying, looked down at the throttles to determine
which engine was vibrating while the captain and flight engineer were both looking .
at the AVMS (Airborne Vibration Monitoring System).
2. By distracting one pilot, the ere,s-monitoring backup function was eliminated and an error
went unchallenged.
While climbing through 270 (for FL 280) the S/O advised no. 4 generator had
tripped off the line. I asked him to monitor the fault panel; a decision was made to
operate the generator isolated.AU ofthis t0ol/no_m0re._an:afew._nds. Upon
looking back at the instrument panel, our altitude was going through 28,000. Cross-
ing traffic (at FL 7290 was in sight). I disconnected the autopilot and leveled off at
28,700.
Table 5 shows how the 19 reports were distributed with respect to the pilot's behavior in response
to the distracting malfunction. Table 6 shows what the "'other pilot" did in the seven reports in
which the malfunction-distraction disrupted the cross-monitoring backup function.
TABLE 5.-- MALFUNCTION EVENTS -- PILOT BEHAVIOR
Pilot behavior Number of reports
Both pilots distracted by malfunction
One pilot distracted when other pilot makes error
Activity of other pilot not mentioned
Total
9
7
3
-19
13
TABLE 6.-MALFUNCTION EVENTS- OTHER PILOT
ACTIVITIES
Activities by "other pilot" Number of reports
Misread S1D
Misread profile descent
Clearance interpretation
Did not reset altimeter to 29.92 in climb
Overshot altitude
On PA" system
Total
1
1
1
1
2
1
7
Fatigue due to long duty periods was noted as an associated factor during two malfunction
occurrence_ It was interesting to note that serious malfunctions or abnormalities did_not trigger any
distraction reports.
The most representative example of minor malfunction troubleshooting draws a disturbingly
clo_ parallel to a recent air carrier crash:
We broke out in the dear at approximately FL 190 (cleared to 16,000) and immedi-
ately lowered the nose and accelerated to about 370 knots. Our rate of sink
increased to 3,000-4,000 FPM. The no. 2 anti-ice light would not exting_sh and
therefore the crew began to troubleshoot the light. The noise level was high; we did
not hear the altitude warning bell. Further, the altitude warning lights are difficult to
see in daylighL The pilot at the controls Was turning on/off the anti-ice switches.
Additionally the pilot not flying the aircraft did not make the required call out of
"1,000 ft to leveboff." An altitude overshoot of 2,000 fi o_ bcfore.the_capt_.
n0ted'the altimet&. .... '....... _'" ..... ::-:_
"Traffic at Twelve O'Clock" Distractions
"Traffic at twelve &dock" is probably the most compelling distraction in the airline cockpit.
It is an urgent alarm. The radar controller's point-out triggers the universal self-preservation instinct
to avert imminent danger.
TABLE 7.- TRAFFIC WATCH DISTRACTIONS
Pilot actions Number of reports
Both pilots looking
Only one pilot looking and other
pilot otherwise occupied
Total
9
7
16
Sixteen "'traffic watch" distractions were
reported. It was significant that, as shown in
table 7, in every event in which a specific target
was specified by the controller the attention of
both pilots was diverted from altitude aware-
ness and management attention to aircraft pro-
gress. Table 8 depicts the results of the distrac-
tions reported; and table 9 details the.resulting
altitude deviations in 12 cases. In some cases,
overshoot of an ATC assigned altitude carded
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TABLE 8.- TRAFFIC WATCH DISTRACTION
RESULTS
Distraction results Number of reports
Altitude deviations from
clearance
Near miss
Nonstabilized approach
No tower landing clearance
Total
12
1
1
2
16
TABLE 9.-ALTITUDE DEVIATIONS
RESULTING FROM TRAFFIC
WATCH DISTRACTIONS
Altitude deviation Number of reports
in early climb phase
In late climb phase
In descent phase
Total
10
1
1
12
the aircraft closer to converging traffic. "We were looking ...'" was a common phrase in such
reporter narratives.
We were cleared to 8,000 It, passing 6,000. Departure control advised there was
VFR traftic at twelve o'clock, 4 miles. My copilot and I strained to see traffic but
were unsuccessful. I asked for a vector away from traffic, was given a left turn. In
the turn I observed I was passing through 8,700 ft. I busted my altitude. (1) Poor
visibility. (2) Report of VFR traffic at twelve o'clock. (3)Target fixation, by both
myself and copilot, being outside the aircraft so that altitude call out was missed and
altitude scan inadequate to prevent exceeding 8,000 ft.
In contrast, a general traffic scan without specific radar targets resulted in attention of only
one airman being Orawn from aircraft monitoring Under these circumstances incidents took place
when the other pilot either made a flight error or became preoccupied with other tasks: flying a
complicated SID, looking at a weather chart,
"doing his cockpit duties and radio work,"
etc. One"nonflying pilot did make the
"l,000-to-level off" call out but the flying
pilot then misread his altimeter with a resul-
tant altitude overshoot. The distribution of
traffic watch conditions reflected in the
16 reports is shown in table 10.
Ironically, a radar point-out of specific
aircraft traffic draws such complete and
sometimes protracted crew attention that
traffic scan is lost in other directions. Many
flight deck truisms have been formulated
from experience: "As soon as you see one
TABLE 10.--TRAFFIC WATCH CONDITIONS
Condition Number of reports
Both pilots looking
Specified targets
Radar point-outs - nonspecific
traffic watch
Only one pilot looking
Specific radar point-outs
General, nonspecific traffic
watch
9
0
1a
6
aNew first officer mentioned.
aircraft, look in the other direction." "It isn't the one you are looking for that will hit you .... "'
An earlier traffic advisory had drawn the attention of the first and second officers
towa,d one o'clock, when a westbound light aircraft passed over us from our nine
o'clock position. The danger of midair collision remains in my opinion, the biggest
hazard in my daily operations. Radar seems to generate a hazard when everyone tries
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to spot traffic we have been advised about, which may be nowhere near our altitude,
and traffic that doesn't show on radar may be approaching from another direction.
In two incidents associated with traffic monitoring, tile setting of incorrect level-off altitudes
into the altitude alert window was an associated factor in overshoots:
The altitude alert was set for 5,000 ft prior to receiving the clearance (force of habit
from experience with this field) .... As we climbed through 3,000 ft we were
advised of traffic at one o'clock and at 3,600 ft. Both of us were looking for the
other aircraft and consequently flew through (our assigned) 4,000 ft. Had 4,000 ft
been set into the altitude alert we would have been subconsciously aware.
Departure requested verification of our altitude which was reported as "'out of
7,800" for 8,000 ft. We were then advised that we were only cleared to 6,000. The
main factor contributing to this flight being at the wrong altitude was that the
wrong altitude was set into the altitude reminder and not picked up b_' any-of the
crew members .... Other factors involved: Our increasing dependence on the alti-
tude reminder which gives no signal that you did not set in the proper altitude. Also
being in VFR conditions, the crew was looking aout for other aircraft rather than
keeping their heads in the cockpit and being more aware of the altitude.
Although in many cases distraction resulted in the specific lookout task being accomplished
with diminished management monitoring of the aircraft trajectory, the opposite situation also
sometimes occurred. The consequences in those cases of inadequate traffic watch were usually far
more serious than an altitude excursion.
Captain and first officer eyes in cockpit in preparation for an approach to ABC
airport. S/O making final adjustment to air conditioning and pressurization. When
S/O looks out again, a light aircraft.is 300 ft immediately in frontof us at our._
altitude moving right to left. S/O calls out "little guy in front of us;' ca.ptain
increases nosedown attitude to pass under the light aircraft. Estimated miss about
50 ft.
We were descending into XYZ, the f'u'st officer was flying, the autopilot was
engaged. We were descending through 9,200 ft at 250 knots in a turn to the left as
an aircraft came into view through the F/O's windshield. He disengaged the auto-
pilot but used little or no control input because the other aircraft was behind us
within about 2 sec of sighting. The F/O and I estimated vertical separation no more
than 100 or 200 ft as it passed directly over the right side of our aircraft.
F/O was climbing the aircraft. I was performing the after takeoff checklist when I
felt a slight negative "G.'" A quick look at the altimeter showed we were going back
through 4,200 ft. Then I saw aircraft B which almost filled the right windshield. It
was so close that we could hear the engines. I would estimate B was at 4,500 ft and
we went under him by about 200 ft. One cannot keep too much of a lookout for
other traffic regardless of being on an IFR clearance.
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Oneairmanreport noted that in pilot response to an ATC traffic advisory, the word "'roger"
was often routinely employed. He makes the important point that often controllers could interpret
the "roger" as "'traffic in sight" when in fact the traffic has not been sighted. He suggests strongly
that AIM publication terminology be used to avoid ambiguous conveyance of such critical com-
munications: "'traffic in sight," "'negative contact," or "desire vectors around traffic.'"
ATC Communication Distractions
Six distraction events associated with ATC communication requirements were reported. Other
cockpit tasks always were linked with ATC communications in excessive workload situations. Five
altitude overshoots ensued during low altitude climb-outs; there was one failure to obtain tower
landing clearance. Other factors were: running a checklist, tuning navaids, and traffic watch.
Upon analysis, it appeared that the ATC communication messages to-from-to/the aircraft were
not the cause of reporter complaint as much as the ATC timing and message conten_t (i.e., turns,
amended clearances, vector headings, etc., occurring at level-off). One crew refused to respond to
ATC.
At lift-off, before gear was raised, ATC was again issuing traffic that was in our
departure path. ATC called no less than two more times in the next 20 see. This is
not the time to be _iven traffic information.
Altitude excursion through climb restriction on departing discovered by crew and
shortly thereafter by ATC. Aircraft departed runway 27 with left turn to join air-
way, tower instructed us .to change to Center frequency. On initial Center callup,
they said to change transponder code; at this point communications broken up by
another air&aft. The F/O said something and I felt a downward correction to proper
altitude. Other factors: atreraft high rate of i_"hmb, cockpit duties, VFR conditions,
checking for traffic, running climb cheek and changing frequencies, etc .....
Distraction Due to Approach Plate or Chart Reading
Fourteen distractions due to studying approach plates or terminal area charts during descent
were submitted by airearrier airmen. Nine altitude deviations (most were overshoots), three near
misses, and one route deviation resulted from the "read-as-you-fly" technique.
Thirteen of the 14 incidents occurred at low altitudes (11,000 ft and below). One incident
involved holding at 17,000 ft, with the captain flying, unable to locate the holding fix on his chart
with a new first officer not being effectively utilized. The autopilot failed to hold and an altitude
excursion resulted. The captain's final comment: "Frankly, the old man was overloaded.'"
There were some indications that eompla0eney may have interfered with adequate preplanning
in these kinds of distraction occurrences. One incident occurred during a profile descent when a
pilot employed an out-of-date chart and the other airman looked at the wrong approach procedure.
The explanation for the expired chart was that revisions had been issued only a week earlier and the
short overnight layover had not permitted time to revise the manual.
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Echoesof complacency might be found also in a pilot's need to study the approach as he
descended because it was his "'first trip after 3 weeks vacation." In a different report - "Neither
pilot had been in the area in the last 90 days" - two captains flying together had their heads down
when a light airplane passed 200 ft over their aircraft.
Five reports involved profile descents. One airman said about the procedure: "Too many heads
down reading during a critical phase of descent. The fewer distractions the crew has during descent
the safer the operation will be.'"
The three near-misses occurred as follows:
1. Air cartier at 10,200, slowing, captain looking at the approach chart. First officer took
evasive action to miss small aircraft, same altitude, later reported as cruising at 9,500 VFIC
2. Air carrier descending to 2,500 ft, just extending flaps and gear, bot.h pilot5" attention in
the cockpit when light aircraft "flashed over engine nacelle at less than 200 ft separation."
3. Air carrier descending, 7,500 ft just outside TeA boundary, "pilot reviewing approach
plate"; first officer took evasive action to miss single engine light aircraft crossing in front of them.
One report ended: "We do not look outside the cockpit enough during near-airport operations.'"
Based on study of the report narratives, distraction through approach plate/chart review does
not tend to combine with other tasks or duties. Apparently it is seldom a function of cockpit
workload and appears to be a short interval laps* in cockpit management and crew coordination.
Weather Avoidance
Distraction due to over-attentiveness to the avoidance of towering buildups, thunderstorms,
and turbulence were classified into two categories:
1. Attentiveness outside the aircraft, visually diverting around buildups(six events)
2. Attentiveness to radar monitoring inside the aircraft (six events)
A controller's report gives the radar observer viewpoint of an altitude excursion during weather
diversion:
Airline aircraft A diverted around weather inbound to XYZ. Aircraft was instructed
to maintain 12,000, pilot acknowledged. Several moments later aircraft A was
observed descending. Pilot concurred, through 11,500 and on collision course with
airline aircraft B level at 11,000. Immediate evasive instructions were issued to air-
craft A to avoid a midair. Estimated distance, when evasive turn was completed,
between aircraft was 2 miles. Aircraft A appeared to also make an abrupt clim.b
maneuver after being made aware of danger. In one scan of radar, aircraft climbed
from 11,300 to 12,000. Using ARTS II readout.
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Several airman reports of weather avoidance expressed some puzzlement as to wily the radar
controller had to be convinced of their need for diverting. The design of ground radar inhibits
"painting" some of the buildup activity able to be displayed on cockpit radar readouts.
"'We were dodging thunderstorms"; "'We were momentarily attentive to outside weather"; and
"'We were distracted from the cockpit to the elements" were airman phrases relating distraction
from altitude awareness.
The six visual avoidance events resulted in six altitude overshoots. Over reliance on auto-
capture of level-off by the autopilot was related in one of these reports.
Although visual dodging of thunderstorms was not associated in the reports with other cockpit
activities, radar monitoring did combine with other tasks in creating an overload. Checklists, navaid
tuning, ATC communications, and fatigue were listed in various reports. All six narratives noted
presence of "thunderstorm activity." Two deviations around weather ended in A..TC interventions or
off-course excursions, and four distractions resulted in altitude deviations.
The workload partially caused by buildups is narrated in one report:
Climb checklists were being completed, navaid tuned and identified, Center being
reported to and radar being continuously monitored.., the 6,000-ft altitude was
missed.
New First Officer Distractions
By adding to cockpit workload, an inexperienced first officer may disturb normal crew man-
agement functioning, Monitoring or instructing the fn_-t officer may distract the captain from
accomplishing his normal duties. In reverse, a captain may be occupied in a routine task and fail to
catch any mistakes brought about by inexperience or.unfamiliarity with route, equipment, or
procedures.
It appears to be a simple ease of too much confidence in a new copilot who simply
hasn't enough line flying after many years in the engineer seat. I was distracted by
rechecking ILS identification, calling the tower, etc., and did not catch the error as
quickly as I should have.
I was discussing descent techniques with a new first officer during a line training
flight. We overshot our descent clearance; the radar controller intervened.
Ten reports associated with new first officers were classified as shown in table I 1.
"Looking for Airport" Distractions
Three air carrier reports indicated that overattention to locating the airport or runway could
distract crewmen from required tasks. Results of the three reported events were: (1)near miss,
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TABLE 11.-DISTRACTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH NEW
FIRST OFFICERS
Captain's activity New first officer activity Result
Duct overheat
Radio tuning
On-line training
discussion
Company radio
Traffic watch
Checklist
Taxiing aircraft
Hying/holding
paltem chart
reading
1 Hying aircraft
1 Flying aircraft
1 Flying aircraft
! Flying aircraft
2 Captain not mentioned
1 Flying aircraft
2 Unfamiliar with airport
1 Not mentioned
Altitude overshot
High airspeed and
low at LOM
Altitude overshot
Altitude overshot
Altitude overshot
Engine overtemp
Taxiied to wrong
runway
Altitude
deviation
(2) deviation from assigned altitude, and (3) during restricted visibility, overshot ILS localizer with
parallel ILS approaches in progress.
TABLE 12.--DISTRACTION EVENTS
ASSOCIATED WITH CREW
FATIGUE
Event Number of reports
Altitude deviations
Approach to wrong airport
Route deviations
Misread chart
Total
6
1
2
1
I0
Fatigue Distractions
Although fatigue is not itself a distraction it
increases the airmen's vulnerability to distractions.
As a human factor, fatigue is listed in ten events
which are summarized in table 12.
The work/rest cycle is highlighted by various
comments: "Seventh approach today"; "'On duty
seve_,_ .Jays in a row"; "'Eight landings in 8-1[2 hr
flight time"; "'Eight landings with three instrument
approaches in thunderstorm activity."
Miscellaneous Distractions
Several occurrences could not be easily categorized. For example, this cryptic report:
Cleared to 12,000 ft but went below altitude due to inattention and irrelevant
cross-talk between us and Center caused by unprofessional conduct in the cockpit.
2O
Or this unusual schedule maneuver:
While performing a pitch trim runaway exercise we overshot our assigned altitude
FL 280. Center told us of traffic at twelve o'clock (at 290); after we leveled at our
assigned altitude we considered tile incident uneventful.
Several reported distraction events could ,lot be classified due to lack of sufficient detail. For
example:
F/O was flying, l acknowledged the descent clearance to 7,000 ft at which time I
was momentarily distracted. We were level at 6,000 when ATC queried our altitude.
l advised we were at 6,000 but should be at 7,000 ....
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This human factor study of air carrier pilot distractions emerged from the relative frequency of
one phrase "'we were distracted by...'" in numerous airmen reports to the ASRS system. In many
cases the sentence was completed by the mention of a routine and ordinary cockpit task.
Implicit in the narrative was airman recognition that by "distraction" was meant attention
diverted from management of the aircraft, especially the maintenance and control of a desired flight-
patlL'There seemed to be general puT_lement as to why, on a particular flight, at a particular time,
accomplishment of usual cockpit tasks suddenly and unexpectedly ended in near-disaster.
Though distraction, as a human factor, eanttot be eliminated from the cockpit, the identifica-
tion and type-classification of distraction incidents suggest possible improved means and techniques
.for minimizing causes of distraction and also for assisting in maintenance of basic concepts in
cockpit management and crew coordination. This is important because distraction is not merely a
cause of individual error:, more critically, it impairs crew concept fundamentals which have been
"'human engineered" to protect against the errors that crew members will inevitably commit.
Distraction is as likely to happen during ground operation as in flight. Schedule pressure
combined with taxi checklists, wing-tip clearances and ATC radio transmissions can result in
unauthorized and potentially dangerous crossings and entries into active runways.
Causes for nonoperational distractions may be minimized through continued emphasis on
cockpit priorities during clJ: tb and descent. Although PA announcements, logbook entries, and
company radio on/off messages may fit into the overall cockpit workload, the crew backup in
confirming correct ATC clearances and altitude adherence may be temporarily lost.
"'Altitude busts" due to misreading profile descent charts may be reduced by format changes
in boldly highlighting DME distances as associated with crossing altitude restrictions. The inclusion
of several different runway procedures on a single page also has led to altitude excursions during
profile "'read-as-you-fly" descents.
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Effects of distraction might be diminished if pilots were cautioned in their early "'guessing'" as
to the ATC clearance altitude to be received. Pretakeoff selection of an ATC altitude Ihat results in
missetting the correcl altilude reminder is linked with distraction into typical overshoots. The
added trap in this error is that a lower altitude restriction is usually due to traffic at the normally
expected level.
Although the convention is that _'one pilot flies the airplane," tile distinction may become
obscured when tile aircraft is under control of the autopilot. Both pilots tend to become vulnerable
to any distraction. Auto-capture of level-off must be monitored.
During a distraction event, indi_'idual pilot misunderstanding or misinterpretation of an ATC
clearance led to numerous altitude deviations. Emphasis should be made on two crewmen monitor-
ing and cross-checking ATC clearance messages. Conversely, ATC controllers should be reminded of
the importan_ of listening for the correctness of clearance readbacks.
The ASRS system records an average of two air carrier potential conflicts every day within
U.S. ai.'rspace. There should be recognition that traffic watch is a "'must" requirement that should be
accomplished without detracting from crew management of the aircraft's desired path. There is a
real and understandable temptation for all eyes to rivet attention to the outside world when fLight
conditions are CAVU and "'traffic at twelve o'clock" has been called. Training is suggested in crew
concept application covering flight control associated with traffic advisories.
Air carder flight standards may deem it advisable to ensure that crew coordination principles
are applied in such "real-life," on-line distractions as weather avoidance, radar monitoring, and
minor system abnormalities during climb/descent phases of flight.
Numerous airmen reports registered chagrin and unease at a radar controller's failure to target
all converging small aircraft traffic. Limitations of a fully automated RDP mode radarscope are not
well known. Further, flight crews seem to be unaware that ground radar does not "'paint" the same
cloud buildups and thunderstorm ceils that they' are tr/ing to avoid.
Distraction is most critical at:
• Ground level to 3,000 ft
• The 10,000-11,000-ft level
• The plus-500-ft altitudes occupied by VFR traffic skirting the edges of TCA airspace
The distraction-due-workload could be reduced and cockpit vigilance increased if low altitude
level-off restrictions and heading changes could be minimized during air carrier SID climb-outs.
Noise abatement procedures already increase the cockpit workload by requiring precision flying
during airspeed changes, power reductions, sharp turns, and altitude and configuration changes;
these maneuvers, added to ATC required altitude level-offs, seriously affect the see-and-avoid con-
cept. One airman stated it concisely:
We need fewer assigned headings during departure. Constant heading and altitude
assignments in dimb diverts crew attention to inside the cockpit, tt forces one
crewman to answer the radio instead of monitoring the other pilot's performance
and keeping a visual watch.
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Perhapsthe ultimateexpressionin slatingtile hazardsignil'icanceof cockpitdistractionis from this
ATC controller'sreport:
The two :lircr_ll shottld never have goltcn together if ,ny clearance had been fol-
lowed. The next timc I looked al the radar 1 observed tile 0300 code convcr_ng
with aircraft B. with both altitude readouts at 8.000ft. At 1218 the two targets
mergcd ....
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A SUMMARY OF THE CHARACTERISTICS OF TIlE ASRS DATABASE
l). W. ltall* ,111¢1A. W. Ilccht*
INTRODUCTION
After 33 months of ASRS program operation, a total of 12,454 reports had been analyzed,
processed, and their safety-related information content entered in the computer files that comprise
tile ASRS system's database. The distribution of attributes among this collection of occurrence and
situation descriptions is interesting and, in many cases, highly significant. The following discussions
describe many of these attribute distributions and point out their possible relation to matters of
aviation safety.
MONTHLY REPORT VOLUME
All reports in the ASRS database are correlated to the month in which incidents occurred. The
total'{ entered by the end of the twelfth quarter (eleventh quarter of database operation) repre-
sented an average monthly entry of 388.7 reports with a standard deviation of 75.9 reports. Statisti-
cal tests of these data have shown that there is no significant overall trend although month-to-
month variations have been substantial.
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Figure 1 is a graphical presentation of the distribution by report month.
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Figure 1.- Monthly report volume.
*Aviation safety researchers, Battelle Columbus Laboratories" on-site ASRS analysis team; Hall is operations
supervisor (of database development activities) and Hecht is air carrier human factor researcher.
tThe statistical dimensions quoted were based on report intake from July 1976 through December 1978;the
reports from the fast quarter of 1979 were not fully processed at the time this statistical summary was conducted
and written.
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SOURCESOF REPORTS
Pilots submitted 48% of the reports received through Marcia 31, 1979, and air traffic con-
trollers submitted 44.%. Table 13 presents the additional classification of "'participants'" for the
4,000 most recent reports. Note that ASRS report "'participants'" include all parties, not just the
reporter, mentioned in any given report narrative. Tables 14 and 15 elaborate further on reporter
qualifications by showing flight hours for pilots and years of experience for controllers. Not all
reporters chose to provide this information. Of 12,414 reports in the ASRS database as of
March 31, 1979, only 1% were anonymous. Of the 5,929 pilots reporting, 5,162, or87%, chose to
provide their flight hours; 5,027, or 85%, chose to provide their flight time during the 90 days prior
to their reports. Of the 5,499 controllers reporting, less than 1% mentioned their experience, but
our reporting form does not provide space explicitly for that entry.
TABLE 13.-CLASSIFICATION OF PARTICIPANTS
Classification Reports, percent
(36)Pilots
Student
Private
Commercial and/or instrument
<1
8
2
Instructor
Air transport
Military
Other
Controllers
Radar
Nonradar
Developmental
Not specified
1
20
5
<1
28
8
1
,'7"
Flight service specialist
Crew member
Passenger
Observer
Unknown
Total
(37)
1
4
<1
<1
22
I00
TABLE 14.- F.UGHTEXPERIENCE
OF REPORTING PILOTS
Reported flight
time. hr
Total flight time
0-3000
>3000
Total
Recent flight time
(90 aays)
0-75
>75
Total
Pilots reporting,
percent
30
70
100
27
73
I00
TABLE 15.-EXPERIENCE OF
REPORTING CONTROLLERS a
Reported experience, Controllers reporting,
yi percent
I-I0
10-20
>30
Total
33
28
26
100
-aAs pointed out earlier, experience was
given by only a small number of reporting
controllers: table 15 is a breakdown of this
small segment of reporters.
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TABLI- 16.- I:RI-_0UENCY OF CALLBACK ACTION
CALLBACKS TO REPORTERS
Type of callbsck RePorts, Percen!
NOt tried
Tried and completed
Tried but not
complete_
Other
Total
$3
11
1
1o3
aThe effort to complete certain calls
_vas discontinued after 5 days in the
interest of de-identifying reports in a
reasonable time period.
ASRS analysts attempted to contact reporters for
additional information in 16% of the incidents. About
1 !% of tile attempts wcre succcssftal; letters were used to
contact I% who could not be reached by telephone.
Table i 6 presents a summary of these data.
HANDLING PRIORITY
Analysts handled 95% of the reports in the database
on a routine bases. In the remaining 5%, analysts sub-
mitted Alert Bulletin (AB) recommehdations to NASA;
80% of the recommendations resulted in the issuance of
an AB.
CHARACTERISTICS OF OCCURRENCES
Problems Discussed in ASRS Reports
In previous quarterly reports (reL 2) we described the use of problem codes to categorize
ASRS reports; although these codes are only general descriptors, they are useful as a means of
focusing attention on certain problem categories. Data on the distribution of reported occurrences
among the problem codes during eleven quarters of the ASRS program appear in table 17.
Types of Operations
Flight operation types are summarized in table 18. This information is incomplete in one
sense because reports involving multiple aircraft (e.g., near midair collision reports) often contained
only the operational category of the aircraft known to the reporter.
Most military re'ports received to date have been provided to ASRS through the cooperation of
the USAF Directorate of Aerospace Safety and The Naval Safety Center. Both organizations rou-
tinely forward their reports to ASPS when the reports concern an interface problem between
military and civil operations. These reports have been extremely helpful, as have the services"
comments on Alert Bulletins describing certain interface problems.
When reviewing these data please note that the reporter is often aware of the involvement of a
second aircraft, but does not know details such as those shown above and in table 19 (aircraft
types) and table 20 (number of engines). Reports containing multiple aircraft are frequent. Of
10,959 reports in the ASRS database that mention aircraft, 6,962, or 64%, concern more than one
aircraft (all 12,454 reports used in this study are summarized in table 21). In 3% of the reports
26
TABI.I- 17.-- DISTRIBUTION O1: ASRS RI-I'OICI'S lh'
PROBLEM CODE
ATC
FI.C
NAV
ACF
APT
PUB
NM A
ACC
OTH
Prol_Icnlcode R.eporlsreceived,pcrcen_
{:m Iraffic conhol fimcliem)
(i]i,.J,t ctcw functio.)
(air ot surface navigation or
communications equipment or
facility)
(aircraft structure ot subsystem
(airport and subsystems)
(publications and procedures)
(potential conflict between
aircraft, not assignable to ATC
or FLC categories a
(aircraft accident) a
(all other classes of problems)
Total
40
37
3
1
3
I00
aThese codes were discontinued in October 1976 upon realiza-
tion that they were not problem areas but, rather, spedfic occurrence
outcomes. Virtually all early reports falling in these categories would
have been classified as either ATC or FLC.
TABLE 18.-TYPES OF OPERATIONS IN
OCCURRENCE REPORTS
User category Report's received, percent
46Scheduled air carrier
Supplemental air carder
Air taxi
Charter operations
Ut_ty flying
Agricultural operations
Corporate aviation
Personal business flying
Pleasure flying
Training, all types
Armed forces
Government, other,
and unknown
Tota!
13
16
16
100
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TABLE 19.-AIRCRAFT TYPES 1N
ASPS REPORTS
Type of aircraft
Small aircraft,
<12,500 lb
Medium transport, 1
12,500-100,000 lb
Heavy transport,
100,000-300,000 lb
Wide-body transport, i
>300#00 lb j
Military aircraft,
all types
Other aircraft
Total
Reports received, percent
42
46
11
1
100
TABLE20.-NOMBER OF
ENGINF_
Number of
engines
0
1
Total
2
3
Reports received,
percent
<1
28
43.
20
9
100
TABLE 21.-NUMBER OF
AIRCRAFT INVOLVED IN
INDIVIDUAL ASRS REPORT
OCCURRENCES
Number of
aircraft
0
1
2
3
Total
Reports,
percent
12
32
52
3
1
I00
mentioning other airciaft, the type is not known (those types known are presented in table 19) and
in 7% of the reports mentioning aircraft, the number of engines is not known (data known are
presented in table 20 for this parameter).
Environment Involved
Table 22, a summary of flight conditions reported, shows that VMC prevailed in most cases.
The predominance of IFR flight plans Fried (table 23) seems inconsistent with this finding. The
inconsistency is explained by reference to table 18 which shows a predominance of reports concern-
ing air carrier operations in which IFR flight plans are required. It is interesting to note tfiat some
type of flight, plan had been filed in 89% of the flights described in ASRS reports. This may be
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TABLE 22.-FLIGHT CONDITIONS TABLE 23.-FLIGHT PLANS FILED
Flight conditions
Visual meteorological
conditions (VMC)
Instrument meteorological
conditions (IMC)
Unknown
Marginal
Mixed
Total
Reports received,
percent
75
19
2
<1
4
100
Type of flight plan
Instrument flight
rules (IFR)
Visual flight rules (VFR)
DVFR or SVFR
No flight plan
Unknown
Total
Reports received,
percent
73
16
<1
10
1
100
indicative of a low level of participation in the system by those general avi.a.tion p_flots who fre-
quently do not file flight plans.
Other environmental attributesof reported occurrences are summarized in table 24 (ceilings),
table 25 (vis_ilities), table 26 0ighting conditions), and table 27 (special weather factors). Not all
ASRS reports contain references to environmental factors present in the occurrences being
reported. Reporters indicate that in 77% of the 4,000 most recent reports weather was not a factor.
Of those reports in which weather was cited as a factor, specific weather problems were mentioned
in 96% of the occurrences. Those specific weather-related problems are summarized in table 27.
Table 28 presents lighting conditions in somewhat greater detail, by breaking a day into
quarters. Table 29 presents reported incidents by day of week. These data, again, are based on the
TABLE 24.--CEILINGS a
Ceilings, ft (agl) Reports, percent
0--1000
1001--3000
3001--6000
6001-10000
Total
50
38
I1
l
100
aceiling and visa'bility data are not
specifically requested on report forms.
Tables 24 and 25 cover only those
reports for which such information
was volunteered. Where ceilings and/or
visibilities were limited or not signifi-
cant, as was the case in most of the
reports, the values were usually not
mentioned.
TABLE 25.---'x,tSmtLrrms a
V_ibilities, n.mi. Reports, percent
0.0-0_
0.6-1.0
1.1--3.0
3.1--5.0
5.1--10.0
10.1--100.0
Total
15
II
39
14
9
12
IO0
aceiling and visibility data are not
spedfically requested on report forms.
Tables 24 and 2S cover only those
reports for which such information
was volunteered. Where ceilings and/or
visibilities were limited or not signifi-
cant, as was the case in most of the
reports, the values were usually not
mentioned.
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TABLE 26.-LIGHT CONDITIONS
DURING OCCURRENCES
Light conditions
Daylight
Applicable to various
light condition_
Nighttime
Dawn and dusk
Total
Reports received,
percent
78
1
14
7
100
alndudes two or more of thepossible
choices appearing on theASRS report
form.
TABLE 27.- WEATHER FACTORS
IN ASRS REPORTS
Weather factor
Precipitation
Thunderstorm
Turbulence
Haze, fog, smoke, smog
Ice
Snow
Other
Total
Reports received,
percent
24
13
7
25
2
5
24
100
TABLE 28.-TIME OF DAY
Tame period Reports, percent
0001-0600
0601--1200
1201--1800
1801-2400
Unspecified
Total
2
30
44
19
5
100
TABLE 29.-DAY OF WEEK
Day of week Reports, percent
Monday
Tuesday
Wednesday
Thursday
Friday
Saturday
Sunday
Unspecified
Total
14
14
15
14
15
11
12
5
100
TABLE 30.-ALTITUDES OF
REPORTED OCK2URRENV._
Altitude of occurrence,
ft (msl)
<I ,000 a
1,001--10,000
10,001--18,000
18,001--30,000
30,001--50,000
>50,000
Total
Reports,
percent
26
52
10
5
<1
I00
alncludes incidents taking place
on airports.
4,000 most recent reports in the ASRS database. Note the
generally even distribution of occurrences reported during
the week; a smaller number of reported events occur on
weekends.
Finally, the altitudes at which incidents ocoaned are
shown in table 30; the same data are plotted in figure 2.
Figure 3 is a plot of altitude distribution of all reported
occurrences, but based on incidents occurring within
1,000-ft-altitude increments.
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Figure 2.- Altitude distn'bution of occurrences by
altitude band (ft, MSL).
Geographic Locations of Occurrences
The geographic locations of occurrences, by state, that led to ASPS reports during the preced-
ing 2-3/4 yr of this project are summarized in table 31 and are mapped in fth'u_ 4. For the most
part; the dism'bution reflects those states with highgeneral aviatio n and air carrier aviation activity.
TABLE31.-ALL REPORTS'BY STATE
California 1640
New York 1013
Texas 890
Florida 712
Illinois 677
Georgia 551
Ohio 517
Pennsylvania 587
Colorado 427
Alaska 414
Indiana 383
Missouri 336
Arizona 322
District of Columbia 308
Michigan 244
Virginia 222
Massachusetts 218
Washington 217
Puerto Rico 201
Minnesota 192
Tennessee 185
North Carolina 172
New Jersey 161
Oregon 152
Hawaii 150
Oldahonm 147
Kentucky 146
W'_,on.dn 138
Arkansas 134
Maryland 133
New Mexico 115
Nevada 111
Kansas 107
Louisiana 102
Virgin Islands 95
Alabama 89_
Utah 86
South Carolina 80
Nebraska 75
Mississippi 72
Iowa 62
Foreign 60
West V'aginia 60
Connecticut 56
Maine 29
New Hampshire 29
North Dakota 29
Idaho 28
Delaware 26
South Dakota 25
Rhode Island 24
Vermont 24
Wyoming 23
Montana 22
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Figure 4.- ASPS reports by state.
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Airspace
Table 32 lists the categories of aLrspace within which occurrences were described. It is worthy
of NCRe that-almost three-fourths of all reports involved controlled airspace (airspace within which
some or all aircraft may be subject to either enroute or terminal area air traffic control).
Air Traffic Control
The type of air traffic control that was being exercised at the time of reported occurrences is
shown in table 33. It should be remembered that this tabulation in no way suggests that these
control facilities were involved in the occurrences reported; on the contrary, some reporters
expressed gratitude to controllers who assisted them during a mechanical or operational problem.
The table does point out, however, that the preponderance of ASPS reports is coming from pilots
who are in contact with the air traffic control system and who are, in more than half the eases,
being controlled by iL The first category in table 33, ATC Centers, is outlined more fully in
table 34.
Phase of Flight
The phase of flight during which occurrences were noted is shown in table 35. Seven percent
of the reports described situations that reporters felt were of general applicability. It is noteworthy
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that the largest fraction of reports concerned occurrences during cruise, whereas accidents are most
frequent during landing and takeoff.
TABLE 32.-FAA AIRSPACE JURISDICTION
DURING REPORTED OCCURRENCES
Type of airspace Rank Reports, percent
AIrporttrafficarea 1 32
On airways 2 22
Terminal control areas
(TCA orTRSA) 3 19
Applicable to various
types of airspace a 4 I l
Positive control airspace 5 I l
Uncontrolled 6 5
Total 100
alncludes two or more of the possible choices
appearing on the ASRS report form.
TABLE 33.--AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL DURING
OCCURRENCES REPORTED TO ASRS
Controlling facility Reports, percent
ARTCC (center)
Approach control
Tower 0ocal control)
Report applicable to various
ATC facilities and functions a
Departure control
Ground control
Hight service station
Unicom/multicom
Company radio
Total
32
18
35
2
8
1
3
<1
1
100
alncludes two or more of the choices appearing
on the ASRS report form.
TABLE 34.--ATC CENTER INVOLVEMENT
Reportsinvolv_ig
Centers
A_a
Albuque_rque
Anchorage
Atlanta
Balboa
Boston
Chicago
Cleveland
Denver "
Fort Worth
Honolulu
Houston
Indianapolis
Jacksonville
Kansas "City
Reports,_
percent
<I
2
6
5
1
2
8
5
4
5
<1
5
7
4
3
Reports involving
Centers
Los Angeles
Memphis
Miami
Minneapolis
New York
Oakland
Salt Lake City
San Juan
Seattle
Toronto
Vancouver
Washington
Total"
Reports:p rcen t
7
2
5
2
9
4
<1
5
3
<1
<1
6
100
TABLE 35.--REPORTED OCCURRENCES
BY FLIGHT PHASE
Flight phase Reports, percent
Cruise
Climb
Approach
Descent
Landing
Holding, traffic pattern,
missed approach, other
Take.off
Applicable to various
flight phases a
Preflight
Total
21
17
16
13
8
8
7
7
3
100
alncludes two or more of the possible
choices appearing on the ASRS repor4 form.
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SUMMARY
This study has described the sources of ASRS reports and some of the types of information
contained in the Aviation Safety Reporting System's database. Future studies will elaborate on
many of these areas and will also discuss those changes taking place over time in the database that
reflect trends in the National Aviation System.
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ALERT BULLETINS
Introduction
The Alert Bulletin (AB) process is one of the principal means by which the ASRS focuses
timely attention on possible problems reported by the aviation community. As in previous ASRS
quarterly reports, examples of Alert Bulletins are included in this report because Alert Bulletins and
the responses to them often reveal information that can be put to good use by persons and
organizations concerned with the National Aviation System. The following examples have been
categorized into seven general classifications to assist the reader in locating Alert Bulletins that may
be of special interest.
Flight Operations
i
1. Text of AB: Various locations: The explanation for "'Expect Approach Clearance
('I_Lme)/EAC '' as defined in the Pilot/Controller Glossary of the AIM does not agree with the
provisions for "expected approach clearance time" as set forth in both the AIM, part 1 section of
Emergency Procedures- Two-way Radio Communications Failure, paragraph IC(3), page 1--81, or
FAR Part 91.127(c)(4). Since, according to the Glossary, an EAC can only be "'... issued whefi the
aircraft clearance limit is a designated Initial, Intermediate, or Final Approach Fix .... " there is no
need for the aircraft to depart the holding fix earlier than the EAC as required by both FAR
Part 91.127(c)(4) and pages 1-81 of the AIM.
Text of FAA Response: FAR 9!.127 is presently being reviewed in its entirety. The objective
is to revise the rule to reflect the present state of the art of both airborne and ground-based
equipment. EAC procedures axe being revised, and coordination is already in progress to reconcile
the publications and simplify the procedures. AIM. will be revised to reflect these .changes.
2. Text of AB: Washington, D.C. National Airport: An airline pilot reports temporary geo-
graphic disorientation, at night, on climb out from runway 36 at Washington National Airport while
using noise abatement procedures. Pilot mistakenly thought the unlighted Rock Creek Park was the
fiver and proceeded to follow the wrong path toward P56. Contributing factors were high deck
angle, high cockpit workload which distracted from following visual cues.
Pilot recommended considering the use of the 326* radial for northwest departures at night as
well as under IMC conditions.
Text of FAA Response: The described noise abatement procedure has been in use since 1966.
Jet aircraft are required to visually follow the river to the Georgetown Reservoir about 4 miles
northwest of the airport. Then they either continue following the fiver or fly the Washington 326
radial to the lO-mile DME. However, when the weather is less than ceiling 3,000 ft or visibility less
than 3 miles, aircraft are cleared to fly the 326 radial from departure. When weather permits, use of
these procedures avoid overflights of Rosslyn/Arlington, as extremely noise sensitive areas.
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This is the first such report received on the Washington National procedure nor is there any
evidence that a similar problem exists at the many other airports using departure procedures
predicated on visual references. We will be alert for reported recurrences but do not intend to
change the procedure, based on this report.
3. Text of AB: Ketchikan, AK, Ketchikan International Airport: It is reported that takeoffs
and landings on ramps and taxiways at KTN are being conducted on a routine basis and without
apparent regard to traffic direction or runway in use by other aircraft. The reporter indicates that
this situation's hazard potential is enhanced (1) during periods of restricted visibility - particularly
when the sun is low, (2) by ground vehicles on the ramps and taxiways, and (3) by the proximity of
a seaplane operating area.
Text of Airport Manager's Response: I do not like to restrict all taxiway operations, but
recognize the problems we could encounter. _ -_,
I have written a memorandum to the Flight Service Station advising them of my requirements
and have initiated a letter of agreement that will be required to operate from the taxiway.
If these measures do not correct the situation, the taxiway will be closed to all takeoffs and
landings.
Text of State Aviation Agency's Response: Thank you for bringing the ASRS Alert Bulletin to
our attention. The airport manager advises that he will be explaining the situation in more detail in
separate correspondence to you. From my conversation with him, it appears that the basic light
aircraft procedures involving takeoffs and landings on the Ketchikan taxiway are reasonable, but
perhaps extra care may be needed during times of adverse visibility to insure that the FSS coordi-
nates all otmrations within several miles of the airport.
tg tg
4. Text Of AB: New York, NY, Kennedy International Airport: A pilot report notes that a
potential conflict situation exists at this facility as a result of charted arrival and departure instruc-
tions to pilots. All runway 4L standard instrument departures out of JFK call for a climb and a
right turn to a 100 ° heading prior to various subsequent departure routings; at the same time, the
missed approach procedures for runway 4R operations call for a climb and a fight turn to the
outbound JFK VOR 077 ° radial. The reporter, whose missed approach decision resulted in another
aircraft's departure being aborted, suggests that these procedures be reexamined to make certain
that both arriving and departing aircraft are adequately protected in the event that a runway 4R
missed approach and a runway 4L departure occur concurrently.
Text of FAA Response: The information contained in the subject report is correct as it
pertains to departures making a right turn to 100 ° off runway 4L at Kennedy. The quoted missed
approach procedure for runway 4R is also correct. While it may appear on paper that there is a
conflict between these two procedures, it is the responsibility of the tower controller to insure that
no conflict does occur. To accomplish this, we do not release a departure off runway 4L when an
arrival to runway 4R is less than 2 miles out on final unless visual separation is applied. If for any
reason an arrival should go around after landing seemed ensured, the controller must avoid a
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conflict by issuingradarvectorsto either or both aircraft or by cancelling the takeoff clearance for
the departing aircraft. This was apparently the case in the situation described in the subject report.
The above procedures were designed for noise abatement purposes and not for any operational
advantage. We believe these procedures to be safe and effective.
5. Text of AB: Various locations: Pilot-participant of several air races suggests that NOTAM's
be issued to advise all enroute airports of race flyby and terminal traffic operations. The same
reporter recommends tfiat all appropriate ATC facilities along the route of flight be advised of the
event and of any special arrangements that may exist to accommodate the event's operations. The
pilot cited the following two examples in support of the above suggestions:
!. During two recent cross-country races, local pilots using airports along the race route had
no way of knowing that race participants were scheduled to use the local airfield for-checkpoint,
fueling_ overnight, or flyby activities. The lack of prior knowledge often resulted in traffic pattern
conflicts and other operational confusion,.
2. The following de-identified excerpt (quoted with permission of the reporter) illustrates the
basic point of the second example:
At our pilot briefmg_ the race participants were advised by the starters that the
restricted areas R-1234 and R-5678 would-be open for us to fly directly through to
our first flyby/fuel stop at the ABC airport. We were advised to squawk XXXX to
point "A" and then squawk 1200. We were also advised that we could ask for traffic
advisories if we so desired and use any discrete code provided by the Center. While
in R-1234 I called the ARTCC to request advisories. They gave me a transponder
code and immediately came back to advise I wasin the restricted area. I was given a
vector to go around the restricted m:ea; i advised Cemter of the pilot briefing saying
the area would be open to us. The controller knew nothing of the clearance or the
air race activity.
Text of FAA Response: It is impossible to speak fully to the two examples given without more
information. If in example 1, the race was coordinated with the FAA and there was an FAA facility
at the arrival airport then there was an obvious breakdown in communication. In example 2, the
ARTCC is virtually always the controlling agency for arestricted area. They in fact would have been
the authority releasing it. If they had opened the area for other than the normal user, the controller
should be aware that it is open for general use. He would not necessarily need to be apprised that
race aircraft would be transitioning the area.
Regardless, we are studying the reporters suggestion for NOTAM dissemination of cross-
country racing information and will advise the Flight Standards Service of the possible need to
include the planning, coordination, and conduct of "air race" type activities in Advisory Circu-
lar 91-45A.
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Navigation
6. Text of AB: Two reports have expressed concern with the Palo Alto Airport Card-A-
Clearance which reads: Cleared Oakland Airport. Turn R/L to heading 0600 to the ILS 27R[29
final approach course, maintain 3000 ft. If radio communication is lost after takeoff, and the
060 ° heading is held, aircraft will be dangerously close to terrain prior to intercepting the
OAK 27 R[29 1LS.
Text of FAA Response: The Palo Alto Airport departure procedures referred to were being
revised at the time of this report. The new procedures specify:
Runway 30: right turn, heading 040°; runway 12: left turn, heading 020 °.
These headings provide adequate terrain clearance. Card-A-Clearance documents have been
revised. :
7. Text of AB: Memphis, "IN, north of Holly Springs VORTAC (HLI) and east of Gilmore
VOR (GOE): A recent report points out the potential for communication misunderstandings as a
consequence of the proximity (9 miles) and phonetically similar names of MANDY and MIDDY
intersections.
Text of FAA Response: Action has been taken to change MANDY to MIOLA_ Coordination
has been accomplished with our Southern Region.
8.. Text-of AB: LaGrande, OR, LaGrande.NDB:. Pilot report statesthat during any weather
condition and at any operational altitude the signal from the LGD NDB is of suchpoor quality that
it is lost on procedure turrm Because of the mountainous terrain surrounding the LGD airport, the
reporter suggests that the NDB be fright checked immediately or NOTAMed off the air.
Text of FAA Response: The LaGrande NDB is a nonfederal facility owned and operated by
the city of LaGrande, OIL The airport-manager/fixed-base operator, ANW-460, and flight inspec-
tion have identified the problem as an electromagnetic interference problem rather than a coverage
problem.
The facility was NOTAMed out of service and the transmitter turned offat 1500Z on Septem-
ber 6, 1978. The Northwest Region and Federal Communications Commission are presently investi-
gating the interference problem.
9. Text of AB: Nashville, TN, Metro Airport and McKellar VOR (MKL): The common fre-
quency (112.0 MHz) of the McKellar VOR and the Metro Airport VOT is reported to b_ causing
navigation problems for aircraft enroute to the MKL VOR. The reporter, an air carrier pilot, noted
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that the situation is particularly noticeable during IFR flights from BNA enroute to Memphis via
the Middy One STAR.
Text of FAA Response: We have reviewed the NASA AB. The difficulty described by the air
carrier pilot could be the result of using a navaid beyond its frequency-protected service volume, or
could be the result of inadequate frequency protection. The McKellar VOR is a terminal (T) facility
which is normally frequency protected to a distance of 25 miles and to an altitude of 12,000 ft.
However, in the case of the McKellar VOR, frequency protection has been extended to 30 miles and
24,000 ft.
The Middy One STAR depicts the course to be flown between the Nashville VOR and McKellar
VOR, a distance of 113 miles. The changeover point is not depicted along this route; therefore, the
pilot probably utilized the Nashville VOR to the midpoint between the two facilities, a distance of
56-112 miles. Since the McKellar VOR is only protected within a 30-n. mi. radius, it is very likely
that an aircraft utilizing McKellar to the midpoint 56-1 [2 miles, would experience harmful interfer-
ence from the Nashville VOT.
This has been brought to the attention of the FAA Southern Region, and corrective action is
being taken to ensure that the McKellar VOR is not used beyond its frequency-protected service
volume. This action should eliminate the problem.
Airports: Lighting and Approach Aids
10. Text of AB: New Orleans, LA, New Orleans International Airport: The following excerpt
(quoted with the reporters permission) describes a condition in existence at this airport:
Recently a new, four-lane, concrete access road was built generally parallel to, and
approximately 1,500 ft east of, runway 01/19. Runway 01 is served by an ILS sys-
tem (and an RNAV approach); runway 19 is served by a nonprecision localizer
backcourse approach.
The access road is righted in such a way as to appear like a runway and is more easily
spotted from the air during times of good visibility due to the factthat the runway
lights (I-1IRL's) are operated at a low step (normally step 2). At night, arriving
aircraft have lined up on the access road thinking that it was the runway. During
IFR conditions.., the access road has also been mistaken for the runway.
The report noted that a number of pilots have commented on how much the access road looks
like a runway, especially during periods of reduced visibility. The situation is alleged to be particu-
larly critical with regard to aircraft on the nonpreeision localizer backcourse approach to
runway 19.
The reporter's suggested solutions to the problem include: (1) printed warnings on approach
plates and airport charts, (2)NOTAM's, and (3)approach lighting systems on both ends of the
runway.
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Text of FAA Response: Numerous night approaches have been made on runway Ill 9 by our
Air Carrier Operations inspector located in New Orleans since opening of the lighted access road
adjacent to that runway. That office has received no complaints concerning possible problems of
identification between those lights and runway lights. The facility m'_nagement of the New Orleans
TRACONITower advises there have been no known incidents where arriving aircraft have lined up
on the access road thinking it was runway 1/t9. Our review disclosed that Air Traffic Services are
not involved in this report. Accordingly, no additional action is contemplated as a result of the
complaint. For your information, there are presently installed REIL's on both ends of the runway
with a VASI 6 servicing the approach to runway 19. A RIAL on the approach to runway 1 has
recently been commissioned. This response has been coordinated with ASW-200 and ASW-500.
11. Text of AB: East St. Louis, IL, BioState Parks Airport: Pilot report notes that the VASI
equipment at this facility, especially that serving runway 12/30, is unreliable and frequently out of
service. Pointing out that the runway 12/30 VASI has been out of service fo? several months, the
reporter expressed hope that the equipment could be fixed quickly or at least NOTAMed out of
service pending proper maintenance.
Text of FAA Response: Although the Office of Airports Programs has no record of having
previously received this complaint, the situation described was indeed unreliable; however, it has
since been repaired and is operational.
12. Text of AB: Bethel, AK, Bethel Airport: Reports have b_en received indicating that the
rotating beacon at this facility cannot be seen more than 3 miles from the airport. Reporters
contend that the dimness of the beacon has resulted in repeated, inadvertent penetrations of the
airport's control zone during periods of IFR operations.
Text of FAA Response: The first airport lighting system was installed in 1949 and included
installation of a DCB-224, 24-in. double-end rotating beacon. This beacon was in continuous service
until the fall of 1977 when the motor drive unit wore out and the beach was replaced with a
Crouse-I-lines DCB-10, 10in. airport beacon. This new beacon meets AC 150/5345-12A specifica-
tions for L-801 beacons_ This problem has been discussed with the State Department of Transporta-
tion and they have informed us that the old DCB-224 beacon is being overhauled and will be
reinstalled when the repairs are completed.
As stated in the Airman's Information Manual, part 1, pages 1-14, an aeronautical light
beacon is a visual NAVAID to indicate the location of an airport, a heliport, etc. Paragraph 4,
pages 1-14, continues to expand on this by stating that pilots should not rely solely on the
operation of the beacon to indicate weather conditions, IFR vs VFR. During daylight hours, when a
visibility, restriction exists, visual sighting of the airport beacon at 3 miles, or the outer edge of the
control zone, may not _e possible even with a larger beacon.
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Airports: Facilities and Maintenance
! 3. Text of AB: Chamblee, Ga., DeKalb-Peachtree Airport: A controller report notes that the
painted lines defining the ramp-taxiway area from runways 2L-20R and 16-34 are so faded that
taxiing aircraft frequently taxi inadvertently onto the active runways. The reporter recommends
that the lines, particularly those between the ramp and runway 2L-20R, be repainted so as to more
clearly delineate the runway boundaries.
Text of FAA Response: FAA representatives have met with airport management at DeKalb-
Peachtree Airport to review existing ramp and taxiway markings. It has been concluded that
existing markings are, to some extent, nonstandard and that an improved markings schematic
should be developed which should preclude inadvertent entry onto active runways. Such a plan is
being prepared and it is anticipated that new markings will be applied within the month of
February, 1979.
It It It
14. Text of AB: It has been reported that the electric wind direction indicator at the Daggett,
CA FSS has been in error by as much as 50 °, and that it seldom indicates closer than 15° to 20 °
from the true wind direction. It is alleged that this condition has existed for several years, and that
attempts to correct the problem have resulted in only temporary improvement.
Text of FAA Response: The Center Field Wind System at Daggett, CA was recalibrated and
restored to service. Indicator errors were noted and corrected at this time. Calibration was accom-
plished by National Weather Service (NWS) personnel.
! 5. Text of A.B: little Rock, AR, .Adams Field Airport: Two recent reports describe an
aircraft on taxiway F crossing the end of runway 32 when runway 14 was active. While the crossing
aircraft did not contact ground control, both reporters suggest that there is a need for appropriate
markings on taxiway F to indicate to pilots that taxiway F crosses the end of runway 32[14 and to
give pilots a visible hold short point when runway 32[14 is active.
Text of FAA response: The Alert Bulletin has been discussed by the Arkansas Division of
Aeronautics, the Adams Field Airport Management, and the FAA including Airports, Flight Stan-
dard, and Air Traffic personnel. The crux of the problem is allegedly insufficient markings on
taxiway F; however, hold lines and runway intersection signs conforming with current standards
were installed during a recent ADAP project. Although no details of the incidents are known, their
infrequeney suggests that the problems were a matter of inattention rather than a system
deficiency.
No amount of reconfiguration or installation of new guidance facilities will provide an efficient
yet fail-safe system. All airport users have a responsibility to operate safely on the field. In our
opinion, this intersection conforms to standards and no correct'lye action is required.
It . It
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16. Text of AB: Santa Barbara, CA, Santa Barbara Municipal Airport- The lack of taxiway or
runway signs is allegedly creating a potentially hazardous situation at this airport, which serves air
carriers, general aviation, and military operations. According to a recent report, the absence of any
directional indicators on the airfield has resulted in frequent conflicts between taxiing aircraft and
aircraft operating on active runways. The reporter points out that the problem is compounded by
the coastal fog that frequently settles in the area.
Text of FAA Response: The manager of the subject airport was contacted and advised of the
bulletin contents. It dealt with the lack of advisory signs near the intersections of taxiways and
runways. It was reported that pilots of taxiing aircraft, especially during periods of coastal fog on
the airport, are having trouble identifying certain intersections.
The airport manager was aware of this problem and is in the process of identifying the
locations for the signs. He intends to coordinate this effort with the ATCT, FBO, and air carder
users. The signs are to be posted as soon as possible and he is to inform this office when completed.
17. Text of AB: San Jose, CA, San Jose Municipal Airport: A recent report notes that a
number of fight aircraft located in the.rtmup area for runway 30L at SJC have been damaged or
badly buffeted by the blast from turbojet aircraft turning onto runway 30L from taxiway A. The
reporter suggests that the runup area be relocated, possibly to the other side of taxiway A, opposite
the current location.
Text of FAA Response: The holding apron for runway 30L at San Jose Municipal Airport is
constructed in accordance with cam_nt FAA standards. General aviation runways at this airport are
30R and 29 which do not have this problem.
ATe: Facilities and Procedures
18. Text of AB: New York, NY, Newark Airport Departures: Several reports have been
received by ASRS regarding rtonuse of preferential departure routes by air carrier aircraft departing
EWR southbound. Preferential route is EWR-CRAN 7-MIV, Shads transition. Requested and flown.
route is usually EWR-JFK-Plume. Use of this routing is alleged to have caused a number of potential
conflicts and problems for LGA and JFK traffic, depending on runway configurations at the latter
airports. In a recent case involving a loss of communications and weather problems, the disruption
was seVere. Reporters suggest that adherence to the preferential routing would alleviate the
problem.
Text of FAA Response: We have reviewed the enclosed Aviation Safety Report and only
partially agree with the suggestion.
" In our normal operation we do strictly adhere to the published preferential routing from
Newark for departures proceeding over MIV. The exceptions occur during periods of light traffic in
the metropolitan area when there is very little impact on other traffic in the system or When severe
weather affects our departure routes.
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Each request, by an aircraft on tile ground at Newark, for the Plume departure routing, is
handled at tile time of the request. If the requested routing would have any impact on the other
two metropolitan airports we deny the request and issue the published preferential routing over
MIV.
During periods of severe weather, tile Plume departure routing may be one of the only
available open routes out of the New York area. It is imperative that we maintain the flexibility to
assign this and any other route during these conditions.
Whenever the Hurtle departure route is used, specific coordination is accomplished and pro-
cedures are implemented for the handling of the aircraft. The use of this departure route does
increase the complexity of the system in the New York area but we do not believe that it compro-
mises safety when handled correctly.
19. Text of AB: Charlottesville, VA, Charlottesville-Albermarle Airport: A controller reports
that following a call from an aircraft experiencing engine problems, CHO ATCT attempted to
obtain either a radar fix or direction finding (DF) assistance for the aircraft. The Washington
ARTCC did not show any transponder return for the aircraft even though the plane was known to
be at 6,500 ft MSL, squawking code 1200. In addition, the request for DF assistance was denied by
the Washington F.S.S. on the grounds that "no qualified DF operators were available.'" The report
notes that the plane landed safely because the aircraft's altitude and the prevailing visibility per-
mitted the pilot to make it to the airport without the requested ATC or DF assistance. While
suggesting that ATCT radar coverage for the Charlottesville area would be beneficial to all local
operations, the reporter contends that at the very least, qualified DF operators should be available
to provide assistance, especially during the frequent periods of reduced visibility in this area.
Text of FAA Response: The .training officer at the Washington FSS, while not recalling the
incident in question, confirmed that at the time of the alleged occurrence the facility was in the
process of checking out their personnel as being DF-qualified. At that point, just a few of the
specialists had received the necessary training. This situation, a belated training program, resulted
from the lengthy delay incttrred in remoting the DF from Charlottesville to the Leesburg site due to
technical difficulties. Unfortunately, the incident took place just a few weeks later when there was
no one on shift fully qualified to wordCthe position.
Since then, however, the majon .t_ of the personnel have checked out on the DF operation, and
the reporter's contention that assistaffre is lacking in this area is no longer valid.
As a matter of information, the reraoting of the DF was the final action associated with the
closing of the Charlottesville FSS and its consolidation with the Washington FSS in Leesburg,
Virginia.
20. Text of AB: San Juan, PR, Puerto Rico International Airport: Controller report" points
out that SJU Approach Control is not assigning the preferred initial southbound routing to flights
departing SJU enroute to Santo Domingo. The preferred routing southbound prior to any westerly
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heading allows climbing, westbound aircraft out of SJU to be separated from descending, inbound
traffic headed for DDP. The reporter contends that this failure to provide initial southbound
headings results in extra controller workload, unnecessary vectors for departing aircraft, and need-
lessly mixes inbound and departing traffic in the same general airspace.
Text of FAA Response to AB: The reporter contends that an existing air traffic procedure at
San Juan, PR, causes extra workload, unnecessary vectors, etc. As at most locations, controllers,
through coordination, frequently shortcut established departure/arrival routes in the interest of
efficiency, noise abatement, or fuel conservation. The established procedures are normally designed
to provide air traffic guidance for the heaviest volumes of air traffic a facility experiences.
If a controller believes that deviations from these routes at any particular time are unwarranted
because of workload, he should immediately apprise the other controllers and his supervisor.
21. Text of AB: Gaithersburg, MD, Montgomery County Airport: A recent report concerning
an aircraft accident during approach to GAI points out that IAD approach control has better radar
coverage of GAI and FDK, and also has MSAW function for these airport areas, yet Baltimore
approach control controls this airspace, requiring landline reports of altitude alerts, etc., from lAD
to BAL Reporter points-out that delays are inevitable in transmission of such critical information
to pilots under this arrangement.
Text of FAA Response: The report is erroneous: The facts are:
1. Flight check data of the Dulles and Baltimore radar systems indicate that Dulles does not
have better coverage than Baltimore in the Gaithersburg-Frederick area. They are about the same.
2. Montgomery County Airport is in the Baltimore approach control area because the most
effective air traffic control service can be provided with this configuration in that area. Traffic flow,
airway alignment, and communications capabilities, as well as radar coverage, dictated the decision.
3. Both facilities (Baltimore and Dulles) have ARTS IH equipment with MSAW capability.
Because it has control jurisdiction for the airport, the Baltimore ARTS III is adapted to provide
MSAW approach monitoring for aircraft landing at Montgomery County Airport. Dulles is not so
adapted because it would not be controlling such aircraft.
22. Text of AB: Carlsbad, CA, Palomar Airport: A recent report describes an occurrence
involving a pilot who requested a special VFR approach to CRQ through SAN approach control. He
was instructed to "Hold, VFR, east of the Escondido NDB (EKG), standard pattern, right turns at
4,500 ft." Another aircraft was holding at 3,500 ft. Ten minutes after commencing the hold, the
pilot heard another aircraft given identical holding instructions at the same altitude of 4,500 ft (two
other aircraft were later given the same clearance). The pilot called to remind approach control that
he was at the same altitude and was told that he had been given a VFR clearance and the pilots were
to maintain their own separation. Weather at the time was 500 overcast, l-mile visibility, tops were
between 1,600-1,800 ft. Although the reporter, a highly experienced pilot, recognizes that/his was
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a VFR clearance, he questions the wisdom of providing a standard holding pattern clearance under
the conditions, and points out that less experienced pilots would be likely to accept suggested
altitudes as assigned - in short, to think and act as though they had been given a standard IFR
clearance. Further, he notes that information as to other traffic in the same holding pattern at the
same altitude was not provided by ATC. Finally, he questions the wisdom of not providing sug-
gested altitudes and asks whether such suggested altitudes could not provide vertical separation
between aircraft.
Text of FAA Response: In investigating this incident, we were not able to determine what had
actually happened. The details of this report suggest that the reporter encountered an abnormal
situation. San Diego approach control does not provide special VFR service to Palomar Airport.
Palornar tower has been delegated this responsibility. Palomar tower does not use navigational aids
as VFR holding points, also the Escondido NDB is too far away (10-1[2 miles) from Palomar to be
of use to the tower as a holding fix. Neither facility assigns mandatory altitudes to VFR aircraft.
Regardless of which facility provided the service in question, the actions desei'ibed-are contrary
to standard ATC procedures. Each facility will instruct their personnel in the correct procedures to
be used by controllers in handling requests by VFR pilots for special VFR clearances.
Ig Ig Ig
23. Text of AB: New York, NY, La Guardia Airport: A pilot reports that while approaching
New York from the south at high altitude, reception of LGA ATIS on 125.95 MHz is interfered
with by RIG ATIS, also on 125.95. He asks whether one or tile other frequencY can be changed.
Text of FAA Response: The Eastern Region has not been able to supply any information on
this problem. The La Guardia ATCT has not had any complaints of interference to their ATIS
broadcasts on 125.95 MHz. The assignment is frequency-protected to a distance of 40 n. mi. at an
altitude of 25,000 ft. We can only assume that the aircraft experiencing=the interference was outside
this volume of airspace.
We do not plan to change either the La Guardia or Richmond ATIS frequency.
Hazards to Flight
24. Text of AB: Pittsburgh, PA, Greater Pittsburgh International Airport: A pilot reports that
dttring takeoff on runway 28R his aircraft's landing gear hit one of a herd of unreported deer, even
though he executed an abrupt pullup maneuver to avoid the animals. The pilot notes that he has
received deer warnings from ATC several times in recent weeks at this facility. The report also
points out that another deer was fatally struck by an aircraft on runway 10L approximately
2 weeks prior to the reporter's incident. The reporter suggests that some additional form of secur-
ity, such as fencing, electrical restraints, lights, or a combination of measures may be indicated to
eliminate or control a potentially critical condition, particularly during nighttime operations at the
airport.
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Text of FAA Response: Deer control programs include spraying of the outer grass areas with a
persistent deer repellent and the harvest of deer by the Pennyslvania Game Commission in and
around the airport area.
Future programs will include controlled harvest of deer by hunters (shotgun only), and the
removal of all trees and bushes in the area now being used by the deer. We are also exploring the
feasibility of installing a deer control fence around the perimeter of the airport.
, it t
25. Text of AB: Evansville, IN, Dress Regional Airport (EVV): Pilot reports indicate that the
dike off the approach end of runway 27 is a hazard. C_art AL-513 does show an obstruction that
might be the dike, but the complaint is based on the camouflaging of the dike by the fact that
everything is green grass, and no obstruction stands out. Concern is about striking gear on dike.
Text of FAA Response: In October 1977, the U.S. Soil Conservation'*ServicTe Completed a
project to improve this dike. At tile present time the dike provides a 20 to I approach to run-
way 27. In addition, there is a two-way road along the top of the dike that provides a def'mite
contrast with the grass.
26. Text of AB: A report indicates that precipitation (rain) at JFK airport was omitted from
two consecutive hourly Weather observations. When questioned by ATC, the weather observer
advised ATC that it was not required to be noted because the precipitation did not hamper vision. It
is suggested that controllers and pilots have a need for precipitation information as it may affect
flight and landing operations.
Text of FAA Response: The weather Observer's response tO ATC was incorrect because the
occurrence of precipitation should be reported irrespective of the visibility. The intensity of precipi-
tation is estimated on the rate-of-fall basis, except that the intensity of drizzle or snow can be
estimated using the visibility as a criterion if drizzle or snow is ocon-ring alone.
The above NASA report has been brought to the attention of the National Weather Service.
27. Text of AB: Portsmouth, VA, Chesapeake-Portsmouth Airport: Lighted towers NNW of
this airport are reported to be 200 ft higher than the 800 ft traffic pattern used by light aircraft
operating into the field. While noting that this condition is particularly important to aircraft
executing a normal downwind entry to runway 02, the report also suggests that some possibility for
conflict exists for aircraft on base leg entries into the runway 10 traffic pattern. The reporter
recommends right traffic patterns for runways 02 and 10; notations regarding the locations of the
towers were suggested for both AIM, part-2, and other industry-published airport directories.
Text of FAA Response: We have reviewed this report through our Air Traffic Division in the
Eastern Region. They, in turn, investigated the situation in conjunction with the appropriate
General Aviation District Office and the airport manager.
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The severaltowersare locatedapproximately 2 miles from the airport and outside of the
traffic pattern. They are presently depicted on the lAP and VFR navigation charts. Additionally,
provisions have been made to accept and publish the appropriate notation in AIM, part 2.
The airport manager has considered altering the left traffic pattern to a right for runways 2
and 10 but is convinced it will result in more confusion than safety.
28. Text of AB: North Naknek, AK: A television broadcast tower, described as being in
proximity to three airfields, is reported to be operating without any aviation obstruction lights. The
tower, stated to be 250 ft tall and 1 mile east of the "State field," is characterized by the reporter
as a hazard to air traffic, particularly during the low visibility and long periods of darkness of the
winter months.
Text of FAA Response: The Alaskan Region reports that upon investigatibn, the tower has
obstruction lights which were out due to a generator failure; this generator was repaired. Also, the
tower is about 6 miles from the airport and is 125 ft as opposed to the 250 ft reported.
Military-Civilian Coordination
29. Text of AB: Hampton, GA, Atlanta Air Route Traffic Control Center: FAA controller
reports that the scheduling activity for Military Training Route IR-722 utilizes pi-ocedures that may
compromise safe separation standards. Reporter cites incidents in which pilots using the primary
entry point for IR-722 are unaware of other aircraft joining the route at the alternate entry point
and vice versa. He suggests a review of present IR scheduling procedures and recommends that pilots
planning entry to the route via either the primary or the alternate point be advised of other aircraft
scheduled to use the route.
Text of FAA Response: The question of operations" on IR-722 (a MARSA MTR) concerns
FAA separation requirement/responsibility of military flights using primary entry points outside
Atlanta ARTCC airspace (Roanoke, VA, APCH. CONT.) while other military flights may be simul-
taneously using the alternate entry in Atlanta's airspace.
FAA Handbook 7610.4D (para. 39) requires military commands authorizing MARSA to
ensure the terms of use are documented and coordinated with the control agency having airspace
jurisdiction. ARTCC's are the ATC focal point for IRs.
FAA Order 7110.77, appendix 3, specifies procedures which correspond to paragraphs in
Handbook 7110.65A. Paragraph 1513.b requires agreed-to procedures for applying MARSA to be
contained in an LOA_
" Atlanta ARTCC and 9th USAF have an LOA which governs operations on IR-722. That LOA
outlines specific separation standards and responsibility.
To clarify responsibilities surrounding MARSA, the following procedures will be added in
Order 7110.77, when it is revised later this year:
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"'AT(? facilities"soleresponsibilityconcerningthe use of MARSA is to provide separation
between participating and nonparticipating aircraft. When MARSA is provided through route sched-
uling, and circumstances prevent the pilot from entering the route within established time limits, it
shall be the responsibility of the pilot to inform the AT(? facility and advise his intentions."
The substance of this bulletin has been brought to the attention of the FAA Southern Region
for discussion with the 9th AF, and HQ, USAF for information and any action they deem
appropriate.
30. Text of AB: Tucson, AZ, in the vicinity of Tusoon International Airport: Reports received
from local pilots describe a potentially hazardous condition in the civilian pilot/student practice
areas west and south of TUS. Recent changes in the placement of military training routes are
reported to have resulted in a significant increase in the mix of civilian flight instruction operations
and high-speed, low-level military operations in this area. Several reporters sdggest'that re.designa-
tion of either the civilian practice areas or the military training routes, or establishment of noncon-
flicting altitude assignments is necessary to eliminate the recently enhanced conflict potential.
USAF Response: Davis-Monthan AFB reports that the MTRS have been redesigned and there
is now no conflict with civilian training areas. Keywords: Military Low-Altitude Training Routes,
Mixed Military/Civil Traffic, Potential Conflict.
31. Text of AB: Dallas, TX, Dallas NAS (Hensley Field) and DFW Tracon: A controller report
alleges that local operating procedures currently in effect between the NBE ATCT and DFW Tracon
involve an inordinate mount of coordination for aircraft departing NBE. Due to the arrangement
of airspace and the provisions of the current ATC agreement, four air traffic control positions must
coordinate before a military aircraft can be released from NBE. Furthermore, the reporter notes
that at one point in the military departure sequence two different controllers are handling traffic in
the same airspace. The controller states that a recent less-than-standard separation occurrence
involving two civil aircraft and one flight of military aircraft was the direct result of a combination
of an excessive amount of ATC time spent on military-civil coordination, and the hesitancy on the
part of one of the civil pilots to fly any closer to the military traffic than he already had as a result
of following ATC instructions.
Text of FAA Reslxmse: The assessment of coordination made by the controller in the subject
report is correct. Due to the high-performance jet traffic operating from Dallas Naval Air Station,
the location in relation to other airports, and traffic flow in the DFW metroplex, this coordination
is necessary to provide separation and safety in the area.
Concerning the statement that two different controllers are handling traffic in the same air-
space, the facility has no procedure that requires this situat';on.
The recent less-than-standard separation occurrence described in the text resulted ih a system
error. This error was generated by one controller allowing an aircraft to enter airspace assigned to
another controller without affecting coordination.
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